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ABSTRACT 
The Internet Threat Monitoring (ITM) is an efficient monitoring system used globally to measure, detect, 
characterize and track threats such as denial of service (DoS) and distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks and worms. . To block the monitoring system in the internet the attackers are targeted the ITM 
system. In this paper we address the flooding attack of DDoS against ITM monitors to exhaust the 
network resources, such as bandwidth, computing power, or operating system data structures by sending 
the malicious traffic. We propose an information-theoretic frame work that models the flooding attacks 
using Botnet on ITM. One possible way to counter DDoS attacks is to trace the attack sources and punish 
the perpetrators. we propose a novel traceback method for DDoS using Honeypots. IP tracing through 
honeypot is a single packet tracing method and is more efficient than commonly used packet marking 
techniques. 
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  1. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet was initially designed for openness and scalability. The infrastructure is certainly 
working as envisioned by that yardstick. However, the price of this success has been poor 
security. On the Internet, anyone can send any packet to anyone without being authenticated, 
while the receiver has to process any packet that arrives to a provided service. The lack of 
authentication means that attackers can create a fake identity, and send malicious traffic with 
impunity. A denial-of-service (DoS) attack [2] is an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent an 
information service’s legitimate users from using that service. These attacks, attempt to exhaust 
the victim’s resources, such as network bandwidth, computing power, or operating system data 
structures. Flood attack, Ping of Death attack, SYN attack, Teardrop attack, DDoS, and Smurf 
attack are the most common types of DoS attacks. The hackers who launch DDoS attacks 
typically target sites or services provided by high-profile organizations, such as government 
agencies, banks, credit-card payment gateways, and even root name servers. 
         A flooding-based Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a very common way to 
attack a victim machine by sending a large amount of unwanted traffic. Network level 
congestion control can throttle peak traffic to protect the network. Network monitors are used to 
monitor the traffic in the networks to classify them as genuine or attack traffic and also these 
monitors gives the traffic as an input to several DDoS detection algorithms for detection of 
DDoS attacks.  However, it cannot stop the quality of service (QoS) for legitimate traffic from 
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going down because of attacks. Two features of DDoS attacks hinder the advancement of 
defence techniques. First, it is hard to distinguish between DDoS attack traffic and normal 
traffic. There is a lack of an effective differentiation mechanism that results in minimal 
collateral damage for legitimate traffic. Second, the sources of DDoS attacks are also difficult to 
find in a distributed environment. Therefore, it is difficult to stop a DDoS attack effectively.  
        Threat monitors are used to monitor the packet flow at the routers level or the network 
level to detect the malicious traffic in the network to avoid the security threats. The ITM is a 
distributed, globally scoped, the goal of the ITM is to measure, characterize, and track a broad 
range of Internet threats. The fundamentally distributed nature of this architecture allows the 
ITM to monitor diverse addresses and topologies. The design of Internet threat monitors (ITM) 
has the major effort in the internet to prevent the users from the security attacks. The ITM has 
two major components data center and the monitors. Each monitor covers the range of ip 
addresses and records the traffic and sends the traffic logs periodically to the data center. The 
data center collects the traffic logs and publishes the reports to ITM system users. 
     The monitor locations of an ITM system can be compromised by introducing several attacks 
by the attackers which includes Localization attacks [1] and DDoS Attacks[3][6] .Which 
exploits some vulnerability or implementation bug in the software implementation of a service 
to bring that down or that use up all the available resources at the target machine or that 
consume all the bandwidth available to the victim machine, this is called as Bandwidth attacks. 
It is clear that DDoS attacks will not stop or scale down until they are properly addressed. 
              One possible way to counter DDoS attacks is to trace the attack sources [17] and 
punish the perpetrators. However, current Internet design makes such tracing difficult in two 
aspects. First, there is no field in the IP header that indicates its source except for the IP address, 
which can be easily spoofed by an attacker. Second, the Internet is stateless in that it does not 
keep track of the path traversed by a packet. Recently, efforts are made to change one or both 
aspects to allow for tracing packets to their sources, known as IP Trace- back.  
                 IP tracing methods can be classified [18] into two categories preventive and reactive. 
Precautionary steps can be taken by the preventive method for DoS and DDoS attack 
prevention. The goal of the reactive methods is to identify the source of attacks, for that these 
method provides the wide range of solutions. The reactive methods are more efficient to identify 
the source even the attacker spoofs their addresses. 
             In this paper we introduce an information theoretic frame work to model existing 
flooding attacks in ITM system monitors. In the flooding attack the attacker sends the large 
volume of unwanted traffic to the targeted monitor for this he uses the botnet. Based on the 
Information-theoretic model we propose an effective IP tracing approach to trace the attack 
source using Honey pots. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Probing traffic based Localization attack [7][8] in which an attacker sends high rate short length 
port scan messages to the targeted network to compromise the monitor locations in ITM system. 
Then, attacker queries the data center to determine whether a short spike of high-rate traffic 
appears in the queried time-series data, for confirmation of the attack. 
     A steganographic localization attack [9] an attacker launches a stream of low-rate port-scan 
probing traffic which is marginally modulated by a secret Pseudonoise (PN) code. While the 
low-rate property prevents the exhibition of obvious regularity of the published traffic data at 
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the data center, based on the carefully synchronized PN code, the attacker can still accurately 
identify the PN-code-modulated traffic in the retrieved published traffic data from the data 
center. Thereby, the existence of monitors in the targeted network can be compromised. To this 
end, the PN-code-based steganographic attack presented in our paper can be understood as a 
covert channel problem [10], because the attack traffic encoded by a signal blends into the 
background traffic and is only recognizable by the attacker which knows the secret pattern of 
the PN code. 
  In [1] introduced the information theoretic framework to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the localization attacks by using the minimum time length required by an attacker to achieve a 
predefined detection rate as the metric. But this frame work is defined in specific to the 
localization attacks only; they are not given any solution for other DDoS attacks. The frame 
work allows the ITMs which are registered within the data center given, and the access is 
restricted to that private region only. But public access of the ITMs and data center allows more 
scope to provide security against different attacks. 
  Both the IP backtracking [18] methods preventive and reactive have their own drawbacks 
while tracing the source of an attacker. Preventive methods can provide only the precautionary 
steps and these do not support scalability and have low compatibility and high router overhead. 
In reactive methods PPM, DPM, ICMP [19][22][23]Trace back and Hash based methods do not 
provide better scalability and some of them require more memory at routers, which is not 
practically possible. 
3. PROPOSED WORK 
In [1] the authors define a model in which the ITMs in the networks sends the traffic logs 
periodically to the data center and the data center collects the traffic logs and publishes the 
reports to ITM system users which are registered, that means it creates the private environment 
or region .In the private region the scope for DDoS attacks are very less, and they are restricted 
this model only for Localization attacks. In this section we have defined a model which will 
provide the following extensions. 
Public accessing: Public accessing of the data center increases the network usage and provides 
better communication with the outside world rather than private environment. In this any user 
from outside the private region can get the communication with the private network, if the user 
is genuine he can get the status of the monitor before sending the data to internal monitors, to 
avoid the attacks. If the user is an attacker, then this status information can be misused to 
perform the attacks on the monitor. The data center sends the status information to any users 
(public or private) based on the request query, but the private (internal) users can get the highest 
priority. 
Usage of Botnets for Flooding Attack:   
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent an information 
service’s legitimate users from using that service. In a DDoS attack, these attempts come from a 
large number of distributed hosts that coordinate to flood the victim with an abundance of attack 
packets simultaneously. The attacker may use the botnets [11], [12] and other alternatives to 
launch the attack.  
3.1 Flooding: 
      Launching a flooding attack:  Once the DDoS network has been set up and the infrastructure 
for communication between the agents and the handlers established, all that an attacker needs to 
do is to issue commands to the agents to start sending packets to the victim host. The agents try 
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to send unusual data packets (all TCP flags set, repeated TCP SYN packets, Large ICMP 
packets) to maximize the possibility of causing disruption at the victim and the intermediate 
nodes. There are certain basic packet attack types which are favorites of the attack tool 
designers. All the attack tools use a combination of these packet attack types to launch a DDoS 
attack. The basic attack types are 
i)  TCP floods: A stream of packets with various flags (SYN,RST, ACK) are sent to the victim 
machine. The TCP SYN flood works by exhausting the TCP connection queue of the host and 
thus denying legitimate connection requests. TCP ACK floods can cause disruption at the nodes 
corresponding to the host addresses of the floods as well. Also the one known tool that uses 
TCP ACK flooding (mstream [13]) has been known to cause disruptions in a router even with a 
moderate packet rate. Both TCP SYN flooding and the mstream attack constitute a group of 
attacks known as asymmetric attacks (Attacks where a less powerful system can render a much 
more powerful system useless).  
ii)  ICMP floods (e.g ping floods): A stream of ICMP packets is sent to the victim host. A 
variant of the ICMP floods is the Smurf attack in which a spoofed IP packet consisting of an 
ICMP ECHO_REQUEST is sent to a directed broadcast address. The RFC for ICMP specifies 
that no ECHO_REPLY packets should be generated for broadcast addresses, but unfortunately 
many operating systems and router vendors have failed to incorporate this into their 
implementations. As a result, the victim host (in this case the machine whose IP address was 
spoofed by the attacker) receives ICMP ECHO_REPLY packets from all the hosts on the 
network and can easily crash under such loads. Such networks are known as amplifier networks 
and thousands of such networks have been documented. 
iii)  UDP floods: A huge amount of UDP packets are sent to the victim host. Trinoo is a popular 
DDoS tool that uses UDP floods as one of its attack payloads. 
3.2 BOTs 
Studying the evolution of bots and botnets provides insight into their current capabilities. One of 
the original uses of computer bots was to assist in Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel 
management [14]. IRC is a chat system that provides one-to-one and one-to-many instant 
messaging over the Internet. Users can join a named channel on an IRC network and 
communicate with groups of other users. Administering busy chat channels can be time 
consuming, and so channel operators created bots to help manage the operation of popular 
channels. One of the first bots was Eggdrop, which was written in 1993 to assist channel 
operators [1]. 
    In time, IRC bots with more nefarious purposes emerged. The goal of these bots was to attack 
other IRC users and IRC servers. These attacks often involved flooding the target with packets 
(i.e., DoS attacks). The use of bots helped to hide the attacker because the attack packets were 
sent from the bot rather than directly from the attacker (assuming a non-spoofed attack). This 
new level of indirection also allowed multiple computers to be grouped together to perform 
distributed attacks (DDoS) and bring down bigger targets. Larger targets required more bots, 
and so attackers looked for methods to recruit new members. Since very few users would agree 
to have their computers utilized for conducting packet floods, attackers used trojaned files and 
other surreptitious methods to infect other computers. 
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3.3 Botnet: 
 One of the biggest threats to the Internet is the presence of large pools of compromised 
computers, also known as botnets, or zombie (drone) armies, sitting in homes, schools, 
businesses and governments around the world. Under the control of a single (or a small group 
of) hacker, commonly known as a botmaster, botnets are often used to conduct various attacks, 
ranging from Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks to e-mail spamming, keylogging, 
click fraud, and spreading new malware. Unlike other types of attacks, botnets which may be 
comprised of thousands of compromised hosts can assemble a tremendous amount of aggregate 
computing power and can perform a variety of attacks against a wide range of targets. For 
instance, a botmaster can command each zombie participant in a botnet to launch spamming 
emails, perform some sort of credit-card theft (gleaned from surreptitiously planted keyloggers), 
and launch DDoS attacks simultaneously against thousands of computer hosts. Because of this, 
hackers are increasingly interested in using botnets to launch attacks to maximize their financial 
gains. At the same time, the degree of destruction caused by hackers using botnet attacks is 
hundreds of times larger than traditional, discrete attacks. Since the appearance of botnets, new 
and sophisticated software modules are added into existing botnet tools every day, offering a 
variety of ways to compromise computers and launch potentially much more harmful attacks.  
 
Recently, the threats presented by botnets are just beginning to be realized. The Internet 
community at-large, law enforcement organizations, individual users, and enterprises alike are 
all beginning to discuss methods to defeat botnets, perhaps the single biggest security threat to 
today’s Internet community. 
Attacking Behavior :In the course of an attack, botnets normally generate a large amount of 
abnormal traffic, which in turn can facilitate easy detection. Furthermore, if more effort is spent 
on understanding the attacking behaviors, a lot more information can reveal important 
intelligence, including the nature of a botnet, the purpose of the hackers, and even the origins of 
the hackers. Based on this information, we can propose more effective countermeasures (e.g., 
detection, prevention and remedy plans). In this paper, we discuss attacking behaviors from the 
following four aspects: 
• Infecting new hosts 
• Stealing personal information 
• Phishing and spam proxy 
• DDoS 
Infecting new hosts: Botnets often recruit new hosts using similar approaches as those for other 
malware (i.e., virus and worm). One of the methods that botnets use to compromise new hosts is 
through social engineering and distribution of malicious emails. In a common scenario, a botnet 
may distribute email messages with malware attached, or perhaps an embedded link to a 
malware binary located elsewhere. Social engineering techniques are used to trick computer 
users into executing the malware, which leads to the compromise of hosts. 
 
Stealing Sensitive Information: Recent botnets have employed sophisticated tools to steal 
sensitive user information from compromised hosts. The most commonly used tools for stealing 
sensitive information are keyloggers and network traffic sniffers. Keyloggers modify host 
operating systems to spy on user activities and capture user key strikes. Network traffic sniffers 
monitor network traffic sent over the subnet of the compromised host. The sensitive data is 
logged by these tools and then compiled into digested formats. Periodically, the data will be sent 
to their botmasters using various communication channels. Some commonly used methods are 
to send data through a designated IRC channel created by a botnet and in emails to a designated 
email address. BKDR_WAR.B steals  keystrokes on a compromised computer in this way.  
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Sending Spam: Botnets are widely used to disseminate spam for different attack purposes. Two 
major advantages for hackers to use botnets to distribute spam (as opposed to sourcing it from a 
single compromised host) are that the victims cannot trace the spam back to the source for legal 
action, and botnets can distribute a much larger volume of spam because of the aggregate 
computing power and vast availability of bandwidth. While some spam is used to distribute 
exploits (malware) as described in a previous subsection, some spam tricks users into visiting 
certain malicious websites, which install malware on their computers by exploiting Internet 
browser vulnerabilities.  
Distributed Denial of Service: A DDoS attack [19] is probably one of the oldest botnet attack 
mechanisms. In the infancy of botnets, hackers began using botnets to launch DDoS attacks 
against a number of large organizations to consume all of their available platform CPU cycles 
and available bandwidth, effectively slowing their services down to a crawl, or knocking out 
their services altogether. For example, both Yahoo! and Microsoft were victimized by DDoS 
attacks launched by botnets in the past years. DDoS attacks still occur, but in a lesser frequency 
and volume. DDoS attacks have even recently been used for extortion. Botnets usually integrate 
a large variety attacking tools (e.g., UDP flooding, TCP SYN flooding, HTTP flooding). Some 
bots, such as PhatBot , even have very customized DDoS tools integrated into their code. 
AgoBot, SDBot, PhatBot, and many other botnets are all capable of launching DDoS attacks 
against a variety of targets. 
Botnet Life Cycle:The success of any process mainly lies in how well the sequence of steps is 
organized. The major reason of dramatic success and spread of botnets is their well organized 
and planned formation, generation and propagation. The lifecycle of a botnet from its birth to 
disastrous spread undergoes the following phases: 
1.  Bot-herder configures initial bot parameters. 
2.  Registers a DDNS. 
3.  Register a static IP. 
4. Bot-herder starts infecting victim machines either directly through network or indirectly 
through user interaction. 
5.  Bots spread. 
6.  Bot joins the Botnet through C&C server. 
7.  Bots are used for some activity (DDoS, Identity Theft etc.) 
8. Bots are updated through their Botoperator which issues update commands. 
3.4  IRC-based Command and Control 
    A bot must communicate with a controller to receive commands or send back information. 
One method for establishing a communication channel is to connect directly to the controller. 
The problem is that this connection could compromise the controller’s location. Instead, the bot 
controller can use a proxy such as public message drop point (e.g., a well-known message 
board). However, because websites and other drop points can introduce significant 
communication latency, a more active approach is desirable. A well-known public exchange 
point that enables virtually instant communication is IRC. 
      IRC provides a common protocol that is widely deployed across the Internet and has simple 
text-based command syntax. There is also a large number of existing IRC networks that can be 
used as public exchange points. In addition, most IRC networks lack any strong authentication, 
and a number of tools to provide anonymity on IRC networks are available. Thus, IRC provides 
a simple, low-latency, widely available, and anonymous command and control channel for 
botnet communication. An IRC network is composed of one or more IRC servers as depicted in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Compromised computers. In a distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS), these 
computers serve three major roles: master controller, command and control server, and bot. 
    In a typical botnet, each bot connects to a public IRC network or a hidden IRC server on 
another compromised system. The bot then enters a named channel and can receive commands 
directly from a controller or even from sequences encoded into the title of the channel.  
3.5  IP Traceback 
      IP tracing methods can be classified [18] into two categories preventive and reactive. 
Precautionary steps can be taken by the preventive method for DoS and DDoS attack 
prevention. The goal of the reactive methods is to identify the source of attacks, for that these 
method provides the wide range of solutions. The reactive methods are more efficient to identify 
the source even the attacker spoofs their addresses. 
     Ingress filtering is an example for preventive methods [19] in this the router blocks the 
packet if that arrives with illegitimate addresses. This method is efficient and suitable when the 
load on the routers is very less. In this ingress filtering method the router must have the 
knowledge to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate addresses, it is difficult to provide 
for the routers, and forge addresses from attackers are also very difficult to identify.  
       Internet Control Message protocol (ICMP) [23 ] [24]is a reactive method where every 
router it prepare trace back message iTrace and that is directed to the same destination as the 
selected packet. The iTrace message itself consists of timestamp, next and previous hop 
information to track the attack source. ICMP Traceback is well suitable for the DoS and DDoS 
attacks to trace the attack source and the router is overburden to mark its address because of that 
router is memory less device. 
       Logging approach logs packets at key routers and then using data mining techniques to 
determine the path that the packets traversed. The advantage of this method is that it can trace 
an attack long after the attack has completed. The drawback of this is it requires the database 
support and potentially enormous resource requirements. Packet marking algorithms are used to 
trace the source address of the attacker by storing the packet in the routers. In Deterministic 
packet marking (DPM) scheme [21] each router marks all the packets passing through it with its 
unique identifier. Router is memory less device in this router requires more memory to store all 
the packets which are passed through it, practically it is very difficult. In probabilistic packet 
marking (PPM) scheme [20] packets are selected to mark according to the probability and stores 
the packets in router in which they passed it. 
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             In Hash Based IP Traceback [22] approach the routers stores the hash value instead of 
storing the complete packet. The memory is minimized compared to the PPM and DPM and 
effectively used for DDoS attacks. But still some memory requirement is there for the routers to 
store the hash value of the packets, this is again practically not possible for larger flow size. 
4. PROPOSED MODEL 
In this paper we divided the entire model into two regions namely private region and public 
region. The Internet Threat Monitors (ITM) are distributed across the Internet and each monitor 
records the traffic addressed to range of IP addresses and send the traffic logs periodically to the 
data center. The data center then analyzes the traffic logs collected from the monitors and 
publishes the reports to ITM system users. The collection of monitors under the data center 
forms the private region because the ITMs are registered before sending the logs to the data 
center. Any user can get the reports of the requested ITM by sending the query request to the 
data center and the data center is answerable to all the ITMs which are registered. 
The public region of our model specifies the unregistered users of the data center who does not 
have any permission to access the data center, but they can get the traffic reports related to any 
ITM by sending the query request to the data center. The data center scope is extended to the 
public domain but it can only give the traffic reports to the public users. Allowing the public 
users or network accessing to the data center and monitors, causes decrease in the performance 
because of the overload of the data center. These can be balanced by introducing the priorities to 
the users; the internal or private region users have the highest priority than the public users .This 
priorities does not disturb the existing scenario but this can enhance the service to the public 
domain ,this will not be a over burden to the data center.. 
In This section we are constructing the botnet as the public user network without having any 
registration with data center and performing the flooding attack on the ITM which is local to the 
data center.  
Generation of flooding attack with Botnet: 
         A DDoS (Flooding) attack mechanism typically includes a network of several 
compromised computers [15]. These compromised computers serve three major role -master 
controller, command and control (C&C) server, and bot. An attacker prepares a DDoS attack by 
exploiting vulnerabilities in one computer system and making it the DDoS “master controller.” 
From here, the attacker identifies and communicates with other compromised systems. A C&C 
server is a compromised host with a special program running on it, this server distributes 
instructions from the attacker to the rest of the bots, which form a botnet[11]. (A bot is a 
compromised host that runs a special program.) Each C&C server is capable of controlling 
multiple bots, each of which is responsible for generating a stream of packets to the intended 
victim. Often, the bots employed to send the flood of requests are infected with a virus that lets 
attackers use them anonymously. 
A Flooding attack happens in several phases: 
• Discover vulnerable hosts. To launch a DDoS attack, attackers first build a network of 
computers that they can use to produce the volume of traffic needed to deny services to 
legitimate users. To create this network, they first scan and identify vulnerable sites or hosts. 
Vulnerable hosts are usually those that run either no antivirus software or an out-of-date 
version, or those that aren’t properly patched. Attackers use these compromised hosts for further 
scanning and compromises. 
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• Establish a botnet. After gaining access, attacker must then install attack tools on the 
compromised hosts to form a botnet.  
 
                     Figure 2: Work flow of flooding attacks using botnet. 
• Launch an attack. In the next phase, attackers send commands to C&C servers for their bots to 
attack by sending hundreds of thousands of requests to the target simultaneously.  
• Flood a target. In the final phase, monitor receives a flood of requests to the point where they 
can’t operate effectively. 
5. PREVENTION 
Preventive mechanisms attempt either to reduce the possibility of DDoS attacks or enable 
potential victims to endure the attack without denying services to legitimate users. 
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• System security mechanisms increase a host’s overall security posture and prevent it from 
becoming part of a botnet or a DDoS victim. Examples of system security mechanisms include 
reliable firewall filtering, proper system configuration, effective vulnerability management, 
timely patch installation, robust antivirus programs, controlled and monitored system access, 
and solid instruction detection. 
• Resource multiplication mechanisms provide an abundance of resources to counter DDoS 
threats, such as increasing the capacity of network bandwidth, routers, firewalls, and servers. 
Additional examples include deploying information services at diverse network locations and 
establishing clusters of servers with load-balancing capabilities. Resource multiplication 
essentially raises the bar on how many bots must participate in an attack to be effective. While 
not providing perfect protection, this last approach has often proved sufficient for small- to mid-
range DDoS attacks. 
 Preventing Flooding Attacks 
     In this section we introduce a general methodology to prevent flooding attacks. It is based on 
the following line of reasoning: 
1. To mount a successful Flooding attack, a large number of compromised machines are 
necessary. 
2. To coordinate a large number of machines, the attacker needs a remote control mechanism. 
3. If the remote control mechanism is disabled, the Flooding attack is prevented. 
           Our methodology to mitigate flooding attacks aims at manipulating the root-cause of the 
attacks, i.e., influencing the remote control network. Our approach is based on three steps: 
1. Infiltrating the remote control network. 
2. Analyzing the network in detail. 
3. Shutting down the remote control network. 
              In the first step, we have to find a way to smuggle an agent into the control network. In 
this context, the term agent describes a general procedure to mask as a valid member of the 
control network. This agent must thus be customized to the type of network we want to plant it 
in. The level of adaptation to a real member of the network depends on the target we want to 
infiltrate. For instance, to infiltrate a botnet we would try to simulate a valid bot, maybe even 
emulating some bot commands. 
          Once we are able to sneak an agent into the remote control network, it enables us to 
perform the second step, i.e., to observe the network in detail. So we can start to monitor all 
activity and analyze all information we have collected. 
   In the last step, we use the collected information to shut down the remote control network. 
Once this is done, we have deprived the attacker’s control over the other machines and thus 
efficiently stopped the threat of a flooding attack with this network. Again, the particular way in 
which the network is shut down depends on the type of network. 
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6. DETECTION OF FLOODING ATTACKS 
In this section we present efficient way of detecting the attacks on the ITMs in the given 
information theoretic frame work. We divide the attack detection process into two phases, 
Firstly the primary detection of DDoS attacks on the ITMs and the later is the detection of 
flooding attacks on the ITMs. 
In the primary detection phases the system detects the attacks based on traffic information 
aggregated from all monitors in the ITM system. If the overall traffic rate (e.g., volume in a 
given time interval) exceeds a predetermined threshold, the defender issues an alarm. The 
threshold value can be maintained either at data center or the individual ITMs based on the type 
of schemes used [1] in the network. In the primary detection phase the system detects some 
attack was happened in the network. If the detection scheme is centralized, then whenever the 
aggregate traffic exceeds the threshold maintained at the data center then the data center finds 
the attack and that attacked monitor can be identified by verifying the individual traffic logs of 
each ITM from the report. Otherwise if the detection strategy is distributed then each monitor 
maintained an individual threshold and checked the aggregate traffic regularly. If the traffic 
exceeds the threshold then it find the attack was happened and sends the status as attacked to the 
data center. After getting the attacked status from the ITM the data center blocks the 
corresponding ITM and displays the status of the ITM as blocked in the status reports, which 
will avoids the further traffic to or from the attacked ITM with the rest of the networks. 
The second stage of detection specifies the detection of the flooding attacks. Once the attack is 
conformed then the data center identifies the attacked monitor and the traffic logs will be 
handover to the flooding detection phase. In this paper the flooding attacks are generated using 
botnet, so botnet tracking is required to detect and block the flooding attacks on the attacked 
ITM.  
      In this section we define the approaches for detecting the botnet. Once the botnet is 
successfully identified and blocked then automatically the flooding attacks can be avoided. In 
this connection the honeypots play the major role to block the botnet by identifying the 
command and control through the IRC server. 
6.1 .IP Traceback Using Honeypot 
         IP Tracing scheme can be divided into two main parts: [25] The Honeypot subsystem and 
The Attack Tracing system. 
     The honeypot subsystem part includes honeypots and log reports with data center. In this 
part the deployment of honeypots, the inducing and entrapping process, and the traceback 
initiate request are accomplished. Attack Tracing System includes ITM(s), this part is in charge 
of the traceback data collection, and statistical inquiry and route rebuild computation.  
6.1.1 The Honeypot Subsystem 
    The honeypot subsystem consists of 4 functional modules: the network deceive module, the 
information capture module, the information control module and the communication control 
module.  
The network deceive module deals with the deceits and inducement against incoming traffic 
flow, in any type of security threats, opening ports and setting sensitive information. The 
information capture module monitors and records all activities in the honeypot. Once the status 
of ITM in data center reports set to “blocked”, it will post a traceback request to the 
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communication control module. The traceback request would contain such information: the 
ITM name, the flow size of the attack, the visit time and flow destination IP address, and so on. 
       The information control module can be used to restrict the honeypot contact activity. Once 
the attack is detected, it guarantees other hazard would be brought in. In practice, such function 
can be accomplished by honeypot bandwidth restriction and routers-firewall cooperation. The 
communication control module transfers the traceback request to the trace service console and 
vise versa, and then receives the traceback result from the service console. 
6.1.2 Attack Tracing System 
This is the combination of Trace service console and data center. This part is in charge of the 
trace instruction dispatch and execution, the trace data collection, route rebuild computation and 
traffic log inquiry. 
Trace service console(s) executes two main operations: Once the trace request from the 
honeypot is received, it will mark the request with a serial number, then dispatches instructions 
to Trace agents(ITMs) in terms of the relevant traffic log; when the ITMs’ feedback arrived, 
Trace service console would rebuild the attack route through the combined data and maintain a 
database for statistical inquiry that includes information as below: serial number, the request 
source, the initiation time, the agents’ feedback data ( can act as proof), and provides user 
statistical inquiry. 
Trace agents (ITMs) will analyze the incoming and outgoing traffic within a sliding time 
window once they captured the trace instructions. They detect the specific watermark feature 
using the relevant algorithm. The preliminary result would go back to the service console. 
Trace service console has 4 modules: Time synchronization, Data synthesis processing, and 
Database and Communication control.Time synchronization provides unified time information 
for Trace service console and all of the Trace agents. Thus the trace events can be analyzed in 
proper association, and the database can use such given time for log. 
         Data synthesis processing combines all relevant information feedback from Trace agents 
(ITMs), and figures out an intrusion route rebuilt result. Data center, on the one hand, records 
all the relevant trace events, such as intrusion serial number, the trace request initiator, the 
feedback from all the agents (together with “proofing” data ), and the final route rebuild result; 
on the other hand, it enables user statistical inquiry with specific terms. 
         Communication control handles the initial trace request from the honeypot, marks a serial 
number for that request, dispatches instructions to Trace agents, and receives the trace feedback 
data.Trace agent includes Time synchronization, Traffic storage, Data analyze and 
Communication control. Time synchronization serves the same as in the console. Traffic storage 
provides the data center for analyze. Because the responding time (the time between the 
intrusion traffic pass the agent and the time agent get the trace instructions from console) is 
rather short due to automatic program, the agent will only reserve a “within sliding time 
window” traffic. 
     Data analyze pickups the source and destination IP address among the stored traffic, and 
verifies with the traffic logs to form a conclusion. Communication control module receives and 
feedbacks on the console’s request.   
6.1.3 Review of traffic flow 
Honeypot has no service traffic with “outsider”, so all network traffic connected to the honeypot 
can be regarded as be probed or intruded. Thus, by means of deploying some “forgery” sensitive 
data into the honeypot and monitoring any access to such data, we can precisely judge whether 
the honeypot is intruded or not. 
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Fig.3 Tracbacking using Honeypot 
 
Access to the entrap file with logs is monitored continually. Once such event occurred, the trace 
request will be initiated by the honeypot. 
Once Trace service console (Data center) receives a trace request from honeypot, it will 
numbers it serially, then dispatch trace instructions to the agents in accordance to the specific 
traffic log information. 
If the incoming traffic has not corresponding threshold, such incoming path is not the one we 
wanted. If the incoming check is positive while the outgoing negative, then the intrusion is 
within such connection. If the traffic goes to specific host, then such a host is the very 
troublemaker. 
        After all, if tracked threshold is found by the Trace agents, the relevant packets and the 
source/destination addresses will be reported to the Trace service console. According to all 
Trace agents’ trace results, Trace service console generates the computation of the rebuilding of 
the final attack path and relevant log information such as: the request initiator, the event serial 
number, the initiation time, the trace result from Trace agents and relevant proofing data, and 
the final trace conclusion, and maps them to the database, After the path rebuilding, Trace 
service console may feedback the final result to the request initiator. Considering the honeypot 
is regarded as “captured”, this feedback is somewhat unnecessary.  
Compared to the existing trace back methods, this method has the following improvements: 
1. The ITM can check and judge attack node or not by using the single packet instead of using 
more number of packets which is used in ICMP Traceback. 
2. The efficiency is improved because of all processing here is fully automated. 
3. Once the attack is detected, the traceback would go all out immediately, does not depends the 
status of the attack. 
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4. The number of packet markings is relatively less compared to the existing methods. 
5. Scalability is high because, the process does not depend on the traffic volume or number of 
honeypots in the network. 
6. Privacy is improved for the packets transferred over the network through the honeypots. 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
    The approach integrates active real time flooding attack flow identification from botnet with 
determining required number of honeypots. The honeypot controller has been modelled at Data 
centre or ITMs to trigger honeypot generation in response to suspected attacks and route the 
attack traffic to honeypots. The performance of the proposed scheme is independent of attack 
traffic due to presence of honeypots at data centre or ITMs. It gives stable network functionality 
even in the presence of high attack load.  
    Some of the avenues for further extensions are with larger and heterogeneous networks. Back 
tracking can be applied on attack flows to reach the attack source. Both of them hold promise 
for evaluating and improving our DDoS detection and defence method and data centre 
information protection. The data centre load can be still minimized by used some distributed 
load sharing algorithms. 
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